Security sector reform and statebuilding:lessons learned by Jackson, Paul
 
 
Security sector reform and statebuilding
Jackson, Paul
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Jackson, P 2012, Security sector reform and statebuilding: lessons learned. in A Schnabel & V Farr (eds), Back
to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development. LIT Verlag, pp. 251.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
  
Chapter 9 
 
Security Sector Reform and State-
building: Lessons Learned 
 
Paul Jackson 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Research shows that the number of wars and their lethality have been 
declining since 1992, and over the same time the worst conflicts declined by 
over 80 per cent.1 However, research also shows that the improvements 
result from more wars ending: the onset of new wars, regrettably, remains 
constant.2 ‘Failed’, ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ states, home to the poorest billion of 
people living in fewer than 60 countries, 70 per cent of which are located in 
Africa,3 are still most at risk of falling into conflict. 
Many of these states may also have a dysfunctional security sector 
that is either politically compromised, chronically underfunded or subject to 
conflict and unable to control sovereign territory or criminal activity. From 
an international donor perspective, ignoring such states risks furthering their 
decline, while carefully designed interventions, including the reform of their 
security apparatus, may help them develop. There is a danger, however: 
adding a security component to overseas development aid could affect 
strategic decisions about aid allocation and shift objectives to meet Western 
security concerns. This would amount to a full securitisation of aid. Given 
scarce resources and global political realities, difficult decisions must be 
made and a clear agenda set to ensure that development and SSR overlap and 
support each other. 
By highlighting the conflict-development link, donors like the UK 
may be in a better position to show that aid money not only helps prevent 
poor countries from declining into conflict, but contributes to keeping the 
West safe. The assumption is that the recurring cycle of violence that derails 
development and human security in general could be broken by a more 
strategic use of international funding aimed at developing opportunities for 
those in conflict-affected areas to make a living other than by resorting to 
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violence to survive. In this approach, a post-conflict agenda based on a 
broader definition of security and its relationship to development could set 
out a new strategic logic for development aid that may make sense for both 
the West and the poorest and most vulnerable. 
This approach, however, raises the question of what or who 
development is for. Are development and support for failed states intended 
to maintain the status quo of existing governance systems and the interests of 
the donors, or do they aim to assist the people on the ground in the affected 
countries? The history of interventions that attempt to construct governance 
systems that deliver development outcomes to the general population, as 
opposed to primarily security outcomes for the general community of states, 
is not necessarily a good one, although such interventions continue, as in the 
international efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This chapter outlines a series of challenges to post-conflict security 
sector governance, understood as management of the national security 
sector. It is written within a conceptual framework that emphasises 
‘governance’ rather than ‘government’, and recognises the large diversity of 
actors and processes and the multiplicity of contexts in which security sector 
reform (SSR) takes place. Making the post-conflict environment more secure 
involves managing, demobilising and integrating militias, establishing the 
rule of law (and justice more broadly), ensuring that past crimes are 
redressed and constructing a security governance system that prevents future 
threats to the general population.4 The security governance perspective 
facilitates a comprehensive approach to delivering legitimate, accountable 
and publicly owned security. This goes to the heart of what it means to 
govern well. 
The post-conflict environment places extreme pressure on the 
relationships within the national security sector, incorporating both 
uniformed and non-uniformed security services (military, police, 
intelligence) and the state institutions and government oversight mechanisms 
that monitor those organisations authorised to use force. Functioning 
oversight mechanisms create a useful pressure to govern the security sector 
accountably, particularly where the military has a history of brutality. 
Delivering appropriate security remains critical to the core functioning of 
governance more broadly. 
This chapter works within a framework that moves beyond institution-
building as exclusively Westphalian. It attempts to place current approaches 
to state-building within a broader historical process and also show that the 
reconstruction of governance following conflict is best understood as a 
function of political networks rooted in substate and regional networks.  
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The post-conflict environment 
 
In post-conflict environments, security sector governance is frequently seen 
as part of the broader development of public administration and governance. 
However, ministries of defence are not always part of unified governance 
reform agendas. In Sierra Leone, for instance, Ministry of Defence reform 
was an integral part of SSR programming, but was completely excluded 
from the more general public sector reform programme within core 
ministries.5 As another example, the post-conflict environment within Nepal 
is dominated by military tension between the Maoist Army and the National 
Army, and a political situation in which the core political parties find it 
extremely difficult to agree. The Ministry of Defence, as far as it exists at all, 
is not capable of policy formulation and the political impasse effectively 
prevents it from developing governance powers. What this means in practice 
is that the discipline of the two forces is achieved by informal political 
agreements and a general commitment to the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. In Nepal’s mistrustful post-conflict atmosphere, the security 
governance system remains fragile and risky, notwithstanding the fact that 
the peace has held for some five years and there has been very little violence 
by international standards.6 
Security governance itself has been seen as an integral element of SSR 
programming within a number of countries. In fact, the development of SSR 
itself (and security governance) has been shaped by engagement in post-
conflict situations. The UK’s experience in Sierra Leone coincided with its 
leadership of the OECD/DAC group that produced the guidelines on SSR, 
for example. As discussed in Chapter 10, while this initially reflected a 
security-driven view of post-conflict intervention, it also incorporated a 
number of broader governance and development objectives, including 
recognition that economic and political development is necessary to support 
security more broadly.7 
However, security sector governance did not start with the 
OECD/DAC, and as the early example of Zimbabwe shows clearly, poorly 
executed security policies aiming, for instance, to reintegrate former 
combatants following civil wars can have political consequences later on. In 
Zimbabwe the political allegiance of the security services has steadily 
undermined the possibility that development gains can be achieved.8 To 
prevent further situations like this, holistically designed post-conflict SSR is 
important in setting the future political agendas of the state and ensuring that 
development trajectories do actually contribute to lasting peace. 
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The study of post-conflict states is blessed with a wide and varied 
lexicon of terms that overlap, contradict and confuse while trying to describe 
varying forms of state collapse. Whether fragile, weak, collapsed or 
neopatrimonial, dysfunctional states all suffer from vulnerability to external 
shocks, internal conflict, competing economic and political structures and an 
inability to exercise effective legal control within state borders. A post-
conflict state may exhibit all these features and be subject to continuing, 
cyclical violence, making the prospect of lasting SSR all the more difficult.  
For an inexperienced designer of SSR, the challenge may be that dire 
conditions create the illusion of a ‘blank slate’, which may appear attractive 
for reconstruction and SSR. However, this notion is dangerous and illusory, 
as it leads those designing SSR interventions to ignore existing norms, 
structures and the country’s previous history. This may result in a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach that can undermine long-term security and development 
sustainability. While SSR donors should be cautious of treating post-conflict 
states as a ‘blank slate’, there remains nonetheless a window of opportunity 
for reform through the provision of a series of entry points. For instance, 
there may be a national will to accept some forms of external support, even 
in sensitive areas like security. This may be complicated when the 
environment is not actually ‘post-conflict’ at all, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
where SSR is taking place under combat conditions. However, when closely 
examined, in many ways the current process within Afghanistan is not fully 
SSR, but rather comprises various SSR-related elements (e.g. security sector 
training, development of a national security strategy) that when combined 
with a broader and more holistic approach could then more closely resemble 
SSR.  
There are usually four core areas identified as central for assessing the 
moment for appropriate intervention:9 context, politics and socio-economic 
position of the population; political will and commitment of international 
actors; local ownership and tension with external interventions; and 
integrated and coherent sequencing. However, given that post-conflict 
interventions are so contextual, it is likely that there is no one set 
methodology or timing, and these four will not be the same in each 
intervention. This means that any international intervention needs to be 
essentially political in terms of picking the right moment to intervene, 
intervening in a sensitive and diplomatic way and taking into account 
domestic political sensitivities within a heightened political situation.  
What has tended to happen is that many interventions have been 
fundamentally technically focused rather than politically aware. The US-led 
SSR intervention in Liberia, for example, was driven partly by technical 
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approaches to efficiency and capacity within the armed forces through a 
private contract between DynCorp and the US government.10 In other 
interventions there has been a tendency to carry out the ‘easier’ technical 
tasks of training police and military while neglecting the more difficult 
governance aspects.11 From this perspective, it is all too easy to overlook the 
political environment in which the intervention occurs, which may be a 
serious obstacle to it progressing effectively.  
 SSR undertaken in a post-conflict state always needs to deal with the 
legacy of the past, which often includes a long authoritarian regime. In such 
cases both the governance structure and the institutional framework will 
need to be reformed. In many African contexts, for example, armed conflict 
resulted from an authoritarian, individualised, political structure that 
excluded specific members of the population (Sierra Leone, Liberia) or 
involved the replacement of a colonial-authoritarian regime with an 
indigenous-authoritarian state (Zimbabwe). The main distinguishing features 
of such post-conflict environments are usually the need to provide 
immediate security, to demobilise and reintegrate combatants, to manage 
post-conflict increases in violence, particularly against women, and to 
downsize security institutions while instituting civilian oversight 
mechanisms that will hopefully prevent the security forces from taking over 
too much authority again in the future.  
Additionally, political considerations come into play due to the variety 
of actors involved in post-conflict reform and governance processes. These 
include international agencies, international militaries, private companies 
and non-statutory security actors, encompassing parties such as insurgent 
groups, religious transnational actors and warlords, as well as civil society 
and government itself.  
 
 
State-building as the practical face of the security-development nexus 
 
The debates on the security-development nexus are vast, and are set out in 
Chapter 2 of this volume. However, what do they mean in practice? The 
World Bank identifies a number of different reasons why security should be 
incorporated into poverty reduction strategies.12 Importantly, the betterment 
of their security is identified as a major issue by poor states themselves. 
Clearly there may be ulterior interests in declaring security as an issue for a 
government caught up in an armed conflict, particularly, in the current global 
context, if a terrorist threat can be defined. However, the importance of 
security at a community level is demonstrated in the World Bank’s Voices of 
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the Poor survey, which shows that poor people also identify insecurity and 
access to justice as two core concerns.13 It is not made clear, however, 
exactly what is included in their definition of security. Understandings of 
what it means to be secure can also, of course, shift. In Sierra Leone there 
was a very noticeable change in local views of security in the post-conflict 
period, from an immediate desire to stop the killing and re-establish order to 
more development-oriented concerns, including reducing crime (particularly 
drug smuggling), economic insecurity (particularly employment 
opportunities) and domestic and sexual violence.14 
The World Bank goes on to cite studies from Paul Collier that show 
the extent to which conflict affects the economy, but then, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, moves on to identify security as a core government issue, a 
public good and an issue of service delivery. It thus returns to the idea of 
security being defined by the capability of the state to provide a service to its 
citizens in a very Hobbesian way.15 This view demonstrates the strong link 
between SSR, security sector governance and state-building as a global 
project.  
Unsurprisingly, state-building has become a focus of much 
international aid, but unfortunately attempts at realising its goals in practice 
have frequently been problematic. A core reason for this is the methodology 
of state-building. As argued earlier, the vast majority of states that have been 
subject to contemporary state-building approaches have received 
interventions that concentrate very much on technical issues, especially 
effectiveness and functionality, rather than on the idea of what a state 
actually is and should deliver to its citizens. There is a clear difference 
between constructing a state apparatus and building a state that delivers 
rights to its citizens, including the right to live free from harm, not least in 
separating the technical process of what states do from the political 
processes involved in what states actually are. 
In Iraq, for example, the United States attempted to construct a 
Western-style state armed with an entire range of neoliberal theories that 
view the institutions of the state as being technocratic and separate from 
politics. As a result of this thinking, the United States dismantled the 
existing state and started all over again, constructing a new set of ahistorical 
institutions alien to the local population.16 Similarly, examples such as East 
Timor (see Chapters 6 and 8) and Kosovo point to the limitations of an 
externally led UN approach that incorporated local elites but marginalised 
the majority of the population, effectively producing states that exist legally 
and are managed by an elite, but remain hollow because they are unrelated to 
local political processes or representation and may lack legitimacy beyond 
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the ruling elite or the United Nations (see Chapter 4 by Kunz and Valasek, 
who argue this point through a gender analysis).17 Both these examples show 
that externally led, technocratic solutions do not necessarily result in a 
successful state.18 
Much state-building is dominated by the construction of exit strategies 
for the intervening party, which often designates a ‘democratic election’ as 
the end point. However, holding an election does not mark the successful 
conclusion of state formation, even though technocrats might argue that 
democracies can be created in this way. Apart from the problems in 
establishing a multiparty democracy in a post-conflict situation, there may be 
a fundamental misunderstanding of what the project of state-building 
actually means in practice. This has important implications for security 
governance, because security institutions are a core element of the state and 
are often identified by poor people as a major threat to their security. 
Constructing security institutions that are representative is therefore critical 
to the future stability of the state and the human security of the population. 
There is much literature on state-building, but it is useful to look at 
representative illustrations of some main approaches.19 Fukuyama, for 
instance, outlines a set of approaches posited on a completely ahistorical and 
technocratic view of states.20 One of the initial points he makes in his 
analysis concerns the lack of institutional memory about state-building 
within policy bodies such as the United Nations. This is complemented by 
the point that state-building takes a long time – it is a long-term commitment 
and requires sustained investment in time and resources.  
Other analysts add to these ideas, but many of these generalised 
comments do not really provide a comprehensive theoretical framework for 
state-building. For example, Hippler outlines a three-point plan based on 
improving living conditions, structural reform of ministries and integration 
of the political system.21 Again, this is a depoliticised version of reality that 
takes the politics out of state-building. In addition, such interventions are 
frequently carried out by bureaucrats, or in the case of security governance 
by military officers from the international community whose concerns are 
primarily technical rather than political.22 
What does this actually mean in practice? Into what is the political 
system being integrated? If it means (as it usually does) integration of the 
political system into the international order, then who owns this process? Is 
it something that enjoys some form of local ownership among those who are 
supposed to benefit, or does it benefit international states relying on a state 
system? A significant silence in Hippler’s analysis is that no attention is 
given to the role of a functioning security sector capable of maintaining a 
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safe environment in which state-building can actually flourish. 
While virtually all current analysts accept that there are problems with 
the nation-state in many of the contexts in which states are failing, there is 
still a tendency to accept the technocratic parameters of state-building as laid 
out by Fukuyama. This casts the nation-state as the norm in international 
relations, ignoring the broadening and deepening of security at international 
and subnational levels, particularly the intra-state nature of much conflict, 
international conflict actors and also the role of the state itself as an actor in 
non-state conflict. There remains an assumption that if we can develop the 
right mixture of policies, then we can create a healthy nation-state that can 
exist in the international order. Rebuilding states on paper does not mean 
that they exist in reality. All states rely on people to make them work, and 
this means that states need to be political structures as well as institutional 
bodies. The implications of this begin with people needing to buy in to the 
state at some level. Commonly related to ideas of legitimacy, there has to be 
some level of support for the state as an institution that represents something 
its populace recognise as a state. In a liberal sense this is realised by 
multiparty democracy, but in reality this type of democratic structure may 
not deliver representation in conflict environments, partly because nascent 
democratic institutions take time to bed down. Somalia is the archetypal 
collapsed state, but this is not simply a function of its own history but also a 
problem of contemporary international relations, particularly the 
universalisation of one model of the nation-state.23 UN-sponsored external 
state-building in East Timor, as mentioned earlier and argued in Chapter 6 in 
this volume, is another example of a failure to embed legitimacy within 
government beyond local elites; and, as the example of Zimbabwe shows, 
replacing one autocracy with another can have dire consequences for the 
population more generally.24 
This raises the second main point, namely that the construction of a 
new state requires a significant cultural change in terms of how people relate 
to that state as well as how they conduct everyday business. In Iraq, for 
example, attempts by the United States to construct a Western state, and its 
initial emphasis on deconstructing Saddam’s state and political party, 
effectively superimposed an artificial state over subnational political 
systems. That state existed solely because the United States supported it, and 
not because there was an underlying belief in it in Iraqi society.25 The risk 
now is that the new Iraqi state will effectively become another faction rather 
than an oversight mechanism for controlling warring factions at subnational 
level. 
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Thirdly, state-building is extremely ‘capacity hungry’. In Sierra 
Leone, for example, the UK provided a lot of technical support for the 
security institutions without giving many resources to building the 
corresponding political support – mainly because it would have been 
difficult to secure. The technical support offered resulted in many UK 
officials taking decisions because those inside Sierra Leone lacked the 
capacity to do so. Ten years of SSR in Sierra Leone have effectively created 
an overdeveloped security force, including intelligence, but without the 
culture of civil oversight to control it.26 This problem is also discussed in 
Chapter 6 on Australian technical capacity-building in the South Pacific. 
Fourthly, given the fact that modern state-building is so resource 
intensive, it is usually externally funded. Because of the degree of financial 
investment, on a political level the process becomes externally driven. This 
creates significant problems with regard to funding and funding priorities, 
particularly when considering local ownership – or lack of it – and, most 
recently, the more limited availability of funds from countries affected by 
the current financial crisis. It raises serious questions about the long-term 
sustainability of reform and security, and also the relative balance between 
different activities; for instance, should donors fund the military more than 
development activities? This remains a core dilemma of international 
intervention. The example of the shifting definitions of insecurity over time 
within Sierra Leone, cited above, shows that the balance of donor 
intervention also needs to change over time to account for changes in the 
security situation, but entrenched interests and the inflexibility of many 
donor planning systems effectively mean that states may be locked into set 
trajectories for some time. 
Fifthly, the creation of functioning state institutions can be very 
uneven. Even where states have had a functioning core before, during or 
after conflict, this core rarely penetrates into the rural areas.27 As a result, 
many people simply do not receive services directly from the state. In the 
area of justice provision, for example, the majority of the population may 
receive justice from customary authorities such as chiefs or village headmen, 
legitimised because a local leader controls local security by controlling the 
local police, militias or ‘vigilantes’.28 At best this can produce a functioning 
governance system in which local people have both a say and a choice in 
terms of accessing services, including security. However, there is a risk that 
such hybrid systems, relying on both traditional approaches and modern 
systems of governance, will also reinforce the position of local elites and 
shore up the kleptocratic tendencies of neopatrimonial rule to the detriment 
of the population.29 
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Lastly, there are inconsistencies between state-building, security and 
development. There is an (unwritten) assumption that human security can be 
best served by creating a functioning state that will, it is theorised, provide 
security as a public good. Then, it is conjectured, development will provide 
benefits to the general population. However, there is a problem with exactly 
how diverse individuals fit into this picture. It is clear that the history of 
institutional development within state-building has not been a happy one for 
many people in terms of guaranteeing their security, and access to security 
has a sad tendency to remain uneven between states, groups and individuals. 
Human security, or ‘freedom from fear’, which implies an entitlement to 
protection by the state in which they are citizens, remains elusive for many 
people. Moreover, states’ (and by extension the international community’s) 
responsibility to protect citizens is yet to be realised in many places. This 
sets up a vicious cycle that justifies or legitimises international intervention 
in failed states.30 
 
 
State-building, SSR and security governance 
 
The development of SSR has been closely intertwined with the growth of 
state-building as a set of activities that coalesced following the collapse of 
many states in the post-Cold War era. In recent years, building the capacity 
of civil servants to provide oversight of defence ministries in particular has 
become more entwined with the development of civil service reform 
programmes as a whole, while security in general has remained central to the 
entire state-building approach from the point of view of both individual 
citizens and the international community, however that may be defined. 
Furthermore, SSR is now understood as an integral part of the international 
community’s approach to conflict management. The reconstruction and 
reform of security institutions following conflict have become central 
elements of international intervention, bolstered by the belief that ‘relatively 
cheap investments in civilian security through police, judicial and rule of law 
reform … can greatly benefit long-term peacebuilding’.31  
SSR is intended to improve the performance and accountability of 
police, military and intelligence organisations, among others, with the aim of 
improving the basic elements of security for individuals. As a process, SSR 
should ideally move far beyond narrow technical definitions of setting up 
functioning security institutions and follow a more ambitious agenda of 
reconstructing or strengthening a state’s ability to govern the security sector 
in a way that serves the population as a whole rather than the narrow 
 SSR and State-building 261 
 
political elite. As argued by Hudson in Chapter 3, this involves a radical 
restructuring of values and cultures within usually secretive and insular 
institutions that are inaccessible to particular subgroups within the 
population, particularly women and youth. The process usually takes place 
in contexts where the general population are mistrustful of security services 
and hostile to organisations that may be viewed as a direct threat to their 
individual security. An SSR process must therefore encompass an ambitious 
set of approaches that can contribute to restoring the social contract. 
Despite obvious difficulties resulting from the political nature of these 
interventions, many international actors are currently involved in SSR 
programmes, including the UK, the United States, the United Nations and 
the European Union. The programmes they deliver employ an array of 
approaches and involve a complex mixture of international organisations, 
governments, non-state actors and private companies. While there are 
significant differences between the US approach in employing DynCorp to 
carry out ‘SSR’ in Liberia and the UN intervention in security and police 
reform in East Timor, there is a family resemblance in terms of the general 
approaches adopted. Some of the challenges of this ‘one-size-fits-all 
approach’ are discussed in Chapters 3, 6, 8 and 11 in this volume. 
There has been much written about SSR, but, as mentioned above, it 
has been subject to what Peake et al. refer to as ‘benign analytical neglect’.32 
This neglect has emerged despite the concept having been developed partly 
from an academic pre-history of civil-military relations. However, much of 
what has been written on SSR has tended to focus on practical policy-related 
analysis rather than being rooted in conceptual or theoretical approaches.33 
Particular activities have received attention rather than looking at wider 
interventions as an expression of and in relation to broader social and 
economic reform.34 In particular, specifics of case studies have been used as 
gateways into discussions surrounding security without really reflecting on 
broader implications. 
 
 
Governance, development and security 
 
In a recent article on the macro-history of the security-development nexus, 
Björn Hettne posits three possible futures: neo-Westphalian, neo-medieval 
and post-national.35  
In a neo-Westphalian scenario the current system would effectively 
continue to function through a state-based structure (with gaps), greatly 
enhanced by stronger multinational organisations with greater and more 
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securitised powers. Such a structure could be multipolar, and might involve 
the inputs of the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) as active security hegemons in their respective regions. Such a 
system may be violent, and create revolution and reaction within non-core 
areas of the global economy. 
Neo-medievalism, on the other hand, represents a less violent option 
in terms of scale, but offers no solution for those areas that are outside 
organised nation-states. With neo-medievalism there is a loosening of the 
state to allow smaller units based on primitive accumulation or warlord 
economics in the short term, leaving those who live in localised pockets of 
violence to suffer that violence. 
Lastly, Hettne posits the idea of a post-national future based on global 
development, which in turn is built on the inter-regional approach proposed 
by the European Union, among others. In this scenario regional governments 
act as vehicles to promote human rights, democracy and conflict prevention, 
and such arrangements are (at least in theory) cooperative and voluntary. 
However, none of these offers a practical solution to developing a 
security-development nexus that provides freedom from fear. Clearly the 
first two scenarios are linked, with the first being both more aggressive and 
perhaps less certain to protect individuals from violence. In the first scenario 
one may be subject to international violence, and in the second to localised 
‘low-scale’ violence (of course, it is not low scale to those suffering the 
violence!). The third scenario may offer some way forward, but there is a 
real problem with an EU-inspired solution, namely that EU decisions are 
based on an arrangement between functioning states that share a great deal 
of common ground, including the collective experience of a European war 
that no one wishes to repeat. This is not the case in, for example, Africa, 
where the experience of regional organisations has been woeful, partly 
because the states that sign up to regional agreements are frequently the first 
to break them. Prospects for the development of comprehensive regional 
actors remain bleak precisely in those areas where conflict is greatest.36 
Regional approaches may offer some way forward in terms of 
renegotiating the colonial boundaries that have contributed to conflict (in the 
Horn of Africa, possibly in the Middle East and clearly in Sudan), but the 
fundamental issue is the nature of the state and the close ties between the 
state, the regime and the individual at the head of the regime.37 Failed states 
incorporate varied political orders, some more legitimate than others. A 
failed state typically lacks a monopoly of force and is unable to extend its 
authority across its entire sovereign territory. It may also suffer from a lack 
of legitimacy, be fragmented by alternative sources of power and face 
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continual threats to its authority. ‘Traditional’ and state functions coexist, 
but may form avenues to political power that the existing regime is 
concerned about. When faced with regimes that have a tendency to creeping 
authoritarianism, the construction of alternative sources of security 
(paramilitaries rather than militaries) and use of the security services to 
protect regimes rather than protecting the state or the population are often a 
problem.38 
All these scenarios offer diverse sets of challenges for SSR 
approaches to tackle if they are to contribute to development and security. If 
SSR is to work, it has to derive from the political structures and history of 
the place it is working in. This is frequently acknowledged in donor 
documentation but not carried out in practice. I argue that the SSR 
intervention in Sierra Leone, despite its shortcomings, was more successful 
than that in Liberia because the Liberian/US approach was effectively to 
contract SSR out to a technical provider and not to engage with the 
government. This echoes the approach taken in East Timor and Kosovo, 
where failure to understand and then engage with the population (as opposed 
to receptive elites) has resulted in states that are not representative and may 
perhaps provide security for the elite/regime but questionable results for the 
population.39 In the case of Kosovo this may be alleviated by accession to 
the European Union, but in East Timor, as in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the 
long-term survival of the state is at least partially dependent on the 
international community. 
Given this set of problems, at least in the short term, we are left with 
the state as the basic building block of any international approach to security 
and development and also as the main means of delivering both security and 
development to national populations. A more nuanced, patient and flexible 
approach to constructing states – a development approach – is therefore 
necessary, as outlined below.40  
Firstly, there should be proper recognition that security is a political 
entitlement of citizens as part of a social contract with the state. It is an 
obligation of the state to provide security for its citizens, not to protect 
personal regimes. It needs to be recognised that this will require substantial 
change on the part of security services, including individual security actors 
committing to not becoming agents of insecurity themselves. 
Secondly, interventions need to be rooted in the specific historical-
cultural-political situation of the country itself, and not just derived from the 
international experience of donors or non-governmental organisations. State-
building has become problematic partly because it does not take into account 
the specific contexts of its application, and the emphasis on multiparty 
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elections as an indicator of the legitimacy of states (or as an exit point for 
donors) is a mistake that may become dangerous, since it may worsen civil 
conflict and entrench it for years to come.41 
Thirdly, it is important to provide a voice to those who are subject to 
violence and support access to justice for victims of state and other forms of 
violence. Poverty imprisons people in situations of extreme vulnerability, as 
do the social and economic roles assigned to those with a lack of 
employment opportunities. Development in the form of functioning delivery 
of justice must be combined with access to income-generating opportunities. 
Both would open a route to emancipation for those trapped in vulnerable 
situations. 
Fourthly, it is important to ensure that security from below is 
grounded in evidence, not idealism or ideology. This applies to the ‘off-the-
shelf’ interventions of some development agents, but also the highly 
romanticised view of some grassroots organisations. Warlords may provide a 
degree of governance, but only in so far as it benefits them and only to the 
limits of state power. Traditional authorities and chiefdom systems may be 
cheap and easily understood, but traditional systems usually discriminate 
against some loser groups at a local level. Not everything at local levels is 
positive or enjoys universal support.42 
The state itself may also be seen as complicit in either making people 
more insecure, through using security services or militias to oppress people 
directly, as in Zimbabwe, using violent organisations to enforce political 
power and patronage, as in Sudan, or through links between criminal gangs 
and state security organisations such as terrorist groups, as in the case of the 
Pakistan secret services. 
In short, ‘smarter’ and more targeted interventions are needed and, 
above all, a far deeper understanding of the politics of intervention over and 
above the technical expertise required to design an SSR intervention. 
Security is an integral element of governance more generally, and the 
provision of security is a key element of legitimacy. Those subject to poverty 
identify security as a key need. In essence, it does not matter what the 
academic debate says about the separation between security and 
development: those who are beneficiaries of development at the lowliest 
levels have already made that decision and accept security as a core need. 
 
 
 SSR and State-building 265 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporary state structures, this chapter argues, are not always the best 
models to deliver security to their citizens. The only way forward, then, is to 
realise the expected connections between the social contract and inclusive 
security. Current neoliberal state-building models are creating more poverty 
and exclusion. If we concede that state-building as social engineering has 
failed, then a discussion of the alternatives is overdue. Just leaving states to 
evolve themselves through some form of ‘historical logic’ is clearly not an 
option if the immediate security of the population is a concern. Politically, 
economically and ethically, it would be extremely difficult to cordon off an 
area of the world and label it ‘failed’. This calls for a way forward that relies 
on pluralistic solutions to different contexts and an understanding of the state 
that does not merely rehash medieval Europe. However, this is typically left 
unsaid in contemporary development and security approaches. 
Shifting colonial boundaries is not the only solution, although that 
may make a difference in specific circumstances like Sudan. In particular, 
there must be an acknowledgement of the pluralism of institutions at local 
level within areas labelled as ‘states’. Politically hybrid institutions, 
combining traditional approaches with modern notions of successful 
governance, exist across most failed states and provide services to 
populations, including security and justice. The question is how can the 
provision of services to the population be delivered without simply 
generating power for local elites? 
  Western political theory finds it difficult to engage with failed states 
in which governance institutions continue to function at some level. There is 
a reality of political order that exists with or without the state. Surely non-
state providers offer an alternative approach that may accommodate 
heterogeneous polities and social organisation and therefore strengthen 
peace-building?43 It is clear that governance does exist beyond the formal 
state sector in many areas, and it is the incorporation of these social 
institutions into security management that remains important. For example, 
intelligence organisations existed right down to the village level in places as 
diverse as Sierra Leone and Nepal. These locally based organisations 
functioned far better than the state versions.44  
  At the same time, there is a sometimes uneasy coexistence between 
state and ‘traditional’ authorities in the security area.45 The delivery of 
security and justice at the local level can be dominated by local leaders, 
including tribal chiefs, who generally exercise considerable power.46 They 
might be able to appoint a customary court, be involved in social regulation 
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through membership of a secret society, have at their disposal a range of 
actions they might take against non-conformists and see the dispensation of 
justice as an exercise of power.47 It is important to note that local authorities 
such as chiefs see the provision of security as a means to maintain their 
power, and they therefore need to be consulted closely when local-level SSR 
is envisioned. The idea of hybrid political orders and the incorporation of 
non-state institutions into SSR and security governance overall rests on a 
number of key assumptions about those institutions. In particular, there is a 
critical question of seeing local institutions as far more legitimate than an 
externally imposed state-building solution. One solution may be to 
incorporate competing claims to legitimacy and authority, and recognise that 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ institutions may coexist. However, it is also 
necessary to recognise that those forms of hybrid governance have differing 
dynamics, and may not only be coexisting but mutually influential or even 
mutually reinforcing. As von Trotha points out, this concept of a hybrid 
order is too frequently seen as being static, downplaying the continuing 
conflicts within such systems to produce variable outcomes as part of an 
ongoing political process.48 These existing social and power structures are 
usually seen as obstacles to the successful implementation of SSR 
programmes, rather than sources of energy that can be assimilated into 
security governance or development programmes. Indeed, without the 
incorporation of some of these networks it may be impossible to achieve 
many desired development outcomes or to construct a sustainable structure 
of security governance. 
  A negative view of such actors tends to ignore what security 
apparatuses look like in those areas beyond effective state control. Whenever 
states abandon an area, other actors step in to fill the vacuum, ranging from 
predatory warlords to traditional authorities and ‘other non-state actors’.49 
Consequently, alternative (to the state) sources of violence emerge and 
develop as proto-states. Contemporary wisdom argues that intervention is 
necessary in such cases, and should centre on state-building since failed 
states have largely failed through succumbing to continual conflict. SSR 
itself, taking security governance as being central, has a tendency to follow 
particular blueprints based on assumptions of what states are. In addition, 
SSR programmes are usually guided by service personnel of donor countries, 
who bring their own experience to bear but usually have no experience of the 
local politics and history in the area where they are operating. As a 
consequence, many officers tend to be naive in their assessment of local 
partners. They also tend to take command themselves, creating internal 
weaknesses in capacity once they return home.  
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  Poorly regulated governance systems are open to abuse, vulnerable as 
they are to developing neopatrimonial tendencies which benefit the local 
elite and maintain patterns of social exclusion. Such structures offer little 
distinction between public and private, state and non-state and public and 
secret organisations. In particular, such clientalist systems tend to undermine 
security governance, replacing ‘security for all’ with security for the 
‘regime’ at a local level. This is usually reinforced by control over local 
power encompassing security, justice and also development decisions in the 
local area. Many ordinary people in the countryside may not be in favour of 
a hybrid solution that just replicates a neopatrimonial system.50 Indeed, many 
people want a just outcome rather than a particular system, and the usual 
claims of local systems being cheap, easy to access and easy to understand 
might be neither true nor a guarantee of justice for groups outside local 
elites. 
  A genuinely hybrid system needs to provide security to both state and 
non-state actors. Such a system will differ from place to place. The question 
arises as to what balance needs to be struck when a hybrid system of security 
governance is encouraged in order to maximise the security and 
development opportunities of the population. 
  Clearly, this question opens a Pandora’s box. Nevertheless, I have 
identified a number of potential ways forward, all of them pragmatic. I 
would suggest that interventions by external actors need to be carefully 
contextualised and, in particular, take into account the politics surrounding 
security. Secondly, there has to be some realism regulating how we work 
with hybrid institutions. There is no simple dichotomy between ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ security systems (however these are defined), and in practice 
these two systems are closely intertwined. In accepting just one or the other 
there is a risk of leaving significant groups of people isolated from services, 
including access to justice. In addition, acceptance of traditional or 
customary systems implies acceptance of a number of elements that may not 
conform to desired development outcomes, including the enforcement of 
human rights. There is no reason why a local community should not provide 
local security (and many do), but there is a thin line between local security 
and thuggish vigilantism. The answer may not be to sweep away systems 
that are imperfect and replace them with another imperfect system based on 
formal law, but to make the existing systems work better so they provide 
more security for more people, more reliably.  
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